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Stock Reaction to Market-Wide Information 
Introduction 
Investor reaction to information as well as whether securities are rationally priced has 
been a topic of considerable interest for over a century.1 Inconsistent with the early evidence 
supporting the efficient market hypothesis surveyed in Fama (1970), more recent US and 
international evidence suggests that stock returns exhibit short-term momentum and long-term 
reversals,2 and that investors tend to under-react to firm-specific news at short horizons and over-
react at longer horizons.3  
Motivated by these empirical findings, Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) (BSV), 
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) (DHS) and Hong and Stein (1999) (HS) propose 
behavioral asset-pricing models that attempt to explain these perceived anomalies. The models in 
BSV and DHS emphasize cognitive investor biases and predict that asset mis-valuation should be 
greatest among firms with greater degrees of uncertainty and poor information. HS emphasize 
gradual information diffusion and predict that slower information diffusion generates more mis-
valuation. Daniel and Titman (2006) show recently that stocks mainly mis-react to intangible 
information not tangible information.  
The behavioral theories usually do not distinguish between firm-specific and market-wide 
information. Intuitively, it is also unlikely that investors would systematically mis-react to 
(intangible) firm-specific news, but correctly understand (intangible) market-wide information. 
Inexplicably, there is as yet no evidence suggesting that stocks under-react to common 
information at short horizons and over-react at longer horizons. Lo and MacKinlay (1990) and 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) find a size-related lead-lag relationship in stock returns which 
suggests that (small) stocks under-react to market-wide information in the short run (one week to 
one month). Lewellen (2002) documents an average negative cross-serial correlation for lags 
from 1 to 30 months, which may suggest that stocks over-react to market-wide information at 
                                                 
1 Fama (1976) credits Bachelier (1900) with postulating the hypothesis that price changes are random.   
2 See Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Rouwenhorst (1998), Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000), Moskowitz and 
Grinblatt (1999), Jegadeesh and Titman (2001), and Lewellen (2002) for US as well as international stock 
momentum evidence. See DeBondt and Thaler (1987), Fama and French (1988), Poterba and Summers 
(1988), Alonso and Rubio (1990), da Costa’s (1995), Clare and Thomas (1995), and Balvers, Wu, and 
Gilliland (2000) for US and international stock reversal evidence.  
3 For instance, Bernard and Thomas (1989, 1990), and Brown and Pope (1996) find short-run under-reaction 
to earnings announcements, while DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) 
find a negative relationship between long-horizon returns and past financial performance measures such as 
earnings or sales growth. See Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) for an overview. 
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both short and long horizons.4 Recently, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) examine whether 
the stock market as a whole mis-reacts to aggregate earnings surprises. They find no evidence of 
market mis-reaction to such news. Given the strong correlation between aggregate earnings and 
macro variables such as industrial production, GDP and consumption, their findings suggest that 
the market as a whole does not mis-react to common information.5 
Given the popularity of the behavioral models, a lack of mis-reaction to common 
information would be an anomaly within this anomaly literature. This observation motivates us to 
revisit the issue of stock reaction to common information. We find that the no-mis-reaction result 
of Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) may be mainly due to their focus on the market level 
reaction, not stock level reaction. In fact, that stocks mis-react to common information may not 
necessarily imply that the stock market as a whole will also mis-react to common information. 
This logically follows because only stocks with considerable uncertainty or slow information 
diffusion (i.e. small stocks) may exhibit the under- and/or over-reaction patterns predicted by the 
behavioral models. If proportionally they represent a relatively small segment of the stock market 
in terms of their capitalization, the reaction pattern may not be evident at the market level. 
Motivated by this observation, we focus on stock reaction to common information at the stock 
level in this manuscript.  
We follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) and use a regression-based approach to examine 
the short-run and long-run reaction of stocks to common information. The behavioral models 
predict that only stocks with poor information/more uncertainty or slow information diffusion 
will have systematic mis-reaction, i.e. small-cap stocks [see Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)] or 
stocks in cyclical industries (which have significant uncertainty). Thus, we focus on two sets of 
US portfolios: size-sorted portfolios and industry portfolios. We find a statistically and 
economically significant reaction pattern to common information as the behavioral models 
suggest. This finding thus complements the findings of stock mis-reaction to firm-specific 
information, and should benefit researchers attempting to understand investor behavior.  
Furthermore, we find that the Fama-French size factor seems to proxy this delayed 
reaction to common information well, and that the delayed reaction to common information is 
primarily due to mis-reaction to intangible common information. Considered together, our results 
                                                 
4 See Appendix for a detailed discussion. 
5 Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), 
and Ferreira and Gama (2007) study whether the aggregate stock market reacts to macro news, not whether 
it mis-reacts. Brennan, Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) study stock reaction to common information; 
but they focus on daily data in the short run.  
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also supplement Vassalou (2003) and suggest that the size factor may not only proxy future 
economic growth, but also the delayed reaction to the news related to future economic growth.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the motivation of 
the paper. Section 2 presents the empirical methodology. Section 3 describes the data and 
presents the empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper with a brief summary. 
 
1. Motivation 
The popular behavioral models predict that only stocks with poor information/more 
uncertainty or slow information diffusion will have systematic mis-valuation, i.e. small-cap 
stocks [see Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)] or stocks in cyclical industries. Therefore, it is possible 
that the mis-valuation they predict may exist at the security level, but not at the market level. To 
see this, suppose there are two securities in the economy: one ( tr ,1 ) has systematic misevaluation 
and the other ( tr ,2 ) does not have. Their return-generating processes are 
 t
K
k
ktkt efbr ,1
0
,11,1 ++= ∑
=
−μ                                                                                     (1a) 
ttt efbr ,20,22,2 ++= μ                                                                                           (1b) 
where ,i tr  is the return of asset i at time t, iμ  is a constant, ktf −  is the market-wide information 
at time t - k,  tie ,  is the firm-specific information at time t, and kib ,  is the sensitivity of stock i to 
the common information.6 Equation (1a) allows stock returns to react instantaneously as well as 
with multiple lags to common information. This formulation is essentially a generalization of 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), who allow one lag. Equation (1b) is a standard one-factor single-
period model. 
Since ktf −  is defined as common information, 0),cov( =−ktt ff , and since tie ,  is 
defined as the firm-specific information,  jiefee ktitktjti ≠∀== −− 0),cov(),cov( ,,, .  The stock 
reaction to the common information is measured by kib ,  for k = 0, …, K.  If there is no systematic 
under- and/or over-reaction to the common information, Kkforb ki ,,2,10, K== .  Thus, 
Equation (1b) is consistent with no mis-valuation. However, if stocks under-react (delayed over-
react) in the short run and over-react in the longer run to market-wide information, 0, >kib  for 
                                                 
6 As in Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), we assume the factor sensitivities are constant and uncorrelated with 
factor realizations.   
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some small k and 0, <kib  for some large k. Consequently, Equation (1a) is consistent with the 
behavioral models.  
 Now consider the value-weighted market return, tMr ,  
 tttM rsrsr ,22,11, +=  
 )()( ,20,222,1
0
,111 ttt
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ktk efbsefbs +++++= ∑
=
− μμ  
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−μμ                               (2) 
where 1s  and 2s are their weights based on their market capitalization. kib ,  for k ≠ 0 should be 
very small., because if there is any mis-valuation, it should be very small in magnitude such that 
investors may not easily observe this mis-valuation and arbitrage opportunity. [Poterba and 
Summers (1988)].7 Therefore, it is evident if 1s  is also relatively small, kbs ,11 should be very 
close to zero. Then, we have  
 )()()( ,22,110,220,112211, ttttM esesfbsbsssr +++++≈ μμ                                         (3) 
Since te ,1  and te ,2  are firm-specific information, te  should be very close to white noise. 
Therefore, even though the market level returns do not under- or over-react to common 
information, at the security level under- or over-reaction may still exist. This observation 
motivates our examination of stock reaction to common information at the security level.  
 
2. Empirical Methodology 
We do not use macroeconomic variables as Chordia and Shivakumar (2002) do to proxy 
common information. We argue that it may be more advantageous to use mimicking portfolios 
(i.e. the market return) to proxy common information instead of using the economic variables 
directly. As Vassalou (2003) points out, economic variables may contain information that is 
irrelevant for asset pricing and may also have measurement errors. Further, only the unexpected 
component of macroeconomic variables contains news that is relevant for asset pricing. To obtain 
the unexpected component, some specification of a structural or statistical model of investor 
expectation is necessary. If any such model has specification error, test results based on the model 
will be unreliable.8 In contrast, it is well-known that the value-weighted market index follows a 
                                                 
7 For instance Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) find on average
,1 0 .1 6ib = .    
8 This well-known problem is called the “bad model problem” by Fama (1998). 
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random walk (see Lo and MacKinlay (1988)), suggestive that market returns do not under or 
over-react to common information. Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) reinforce this 
observation by demonstrating that market returns do not mis-react to aggregate earnings 
surprises. Thus, if there is any macro information relevant for asset pricing, the stock market as a 
whole will react correctly or at least very close to correctly, and consequently, the value-weighted 
market return is itself a good summary proxy for all relevant common information. Brennan, 
Jegadeesh, and Swaminathan (1993) concisely point out that “(t)he market return may be viewed 
as a linear combination of the contemporaneous common factors” (p809). This same intuition 
also motives Jegadeesh and Titman (1995) to use the market return as the proxy for common 
information. 
To examine the stock reaction to common information, we estimate Equation (1a) 
directly as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). We use the value-weighted market return as the 
summary proxy for all relevant common information. Motivated by the momentum and reversal 
findings of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), we include lagged market returns for up to two years.9 
If we allow lagged market returns for up to two years and estimate Equation (1a) directly, the test 
may lack power, because each individual kib ,  may be very small in magnitude. To increase 
statistical power, we instead estimate the following model for each asset.  
ti
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This specification will not result in a loss of information, because what are relevant are the signs 
rather than the magnitudes of kib , . The behavioral models predict that kib ,  may have different 
signs over different horizons. To consider this, we choose one month, one year, and two years. 
These seem to be natural intervals and are widely used in the literature [see Poterba and Summers 
(1988)]. If investors under-react at short horizons and over-react at longer horizons to common 
information as the behavioral models predict, coefficients of lagged market returns should be 
significantly positive at some short horizons and negative at some longer horizons. 
 
3. Data and Empirical Results 
3.1 Data 
Following Lewellen (2002), we focus on the post Great Depression period, January 1941 
to August 2007. The behavioral models predict that only stocks with poor information/more 
                                                 
9 Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest that it may take two years for the market to fully incorporate 
information. 
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uncertainty or slow information diffusion will have systematic mis-valuation, i.e. small-cap 
stocks [see Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000)] or stocks in cyclical industries. Thus, we focus on 10 
size-sorted portfolios and 10 industry portfolios for empirical investigation. The monthly equal-
weighted return data are downloaded from Kenneth French’s website.10 Table 1 reports the 
summary statistics of the portfolio returns, with average return and variance for each portfolio 
and each portfolio’s beta with the market index. 
 
Table 1 Summary Statistics: 1941:01-2007:08 
 Mean Variance CAPM β 
Small 1 0.0148 0.0047 1.1502 
2 0.0111 0.0038 1.2413 
3 0.0113 0.0033 1.2204 
4 0.0107 0.0031 1.1992 
5 0.0108 0.0029 1.1800 
6 0.0104 0.0026 1.1429 
7 0.0107 0.0024 1.1310 
8 0.0101 0.0023 1.1056 
9 0.0100 0.0020 1.0291 
big 10 0.0086 0.0018 0.9879 
    
NoDur 0.0105 0.0024 0.9546 
Durbl 0.0101 0.0038 1.2035 
Manuf 0.0114 0.0029 1.1172 
Energy 0.0133 0.0042 1.0431 
HiTec 0.0117 0.0058 1.4786 
Telcm 0.0118 0.0044 1.2457 
Shops 0.0109 0.0030 1.0682 
Hlth 0.0133 0.0041 1.2055 
Utils 0.0110 0.0017 0.6327 
Other 0.0126 0.0030 1.0555 
 
3.2 Under- and Over-reaction to Common Information  
The behavioral models predict that small-cap stocks may have stronger mis-valuation 
than large-cap stocks due to poor information or slow information diffusion [see Hong, Lim, and 
Stein (2000)]. Consequently, we should expect small-cap stocks to have stronger under-reaction 
at short horizons and over-reaction at longer horizons to information than large-cap stocks. Table 
2 reports ,i kb  estimates and associated t-statistics for returns of 10 size-sorted portfolios. The 
values reported in the main rows are the actual values of ,i kb estimates, and the entries below are 
the Newey-West test statistics. As we can see, 1,ib , the sensitivity of stock returns to common 
                                                 
10 We thank Fama and French for making these data available at 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/. 
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information at lag 1, is generally positive, while 2,ib  and 3,ib , the sensitivities to common 
information at lags 2 to 24, are generally negative.11 This suggests that stocks generally under-
react at short horizons (one month lag) and overreact at longer horizons. Furthermore, 
,i kb estimates tend to decrease in magnitude as the size increases, suggesting that smaller stocks 
have stronger under-reaction at short horizons and over-reaction at longer horizons. These results 
seem to support the behavioral models. 
 
Table 2 Size Portfolios 1941:01-2007:-8 
We estimate the following model for each size-sorted portfolio.  
12 24
, ,0 ,1 1 ,2 ,3 ,
2 13
i t i i t i t i t k i t k i t
k k
r b f b f b f b f eμ − − −
=
= + + + + +∑ ∑         
where tir ,  is the return of asset i at time t, ktf −  is the market-wide information at time t – k measured by the 
value-weighted market return,  and kib ,  is the sensitivity of stock i to the common information. ,i kb  estimates 
are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test t-statistics immediately below each main row. 
Size 
iμ  0,ib  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  2R  
Small 1 0.007 1.118 0.342 -0.022 -0.035 0.538 
 2.45 21.4 7.39 -1.83 -2.86  
2 0.001 1.223 0.203 -0.015 -0.019 0.728 
 0.76 32.84 5.72 -1.66 -2.44  
3 0.002 1.206 0.150 -0.018 -0.015 0.792 
 1.39 39.33 5.14 -2.48 -2.53  
4 0.001 1.187 0.127 -0.012 -0.016 0.812 
 0.95 39.85 4.74 -1.78 -2.98  
5 0.002 1.171 0.093 -0.014 -0.011 0.842 
 1.44 42.46 4.19 -2.55 -2.30  
6 0.001 1.136 0.069 -0.011 -0.009 0.872 
 1.35 46.34 3.3 -2.22 -2.21  
7 0.002 1.125 0.058 -0.012 -0.008 0.908 
 1.98 62.08 3.49 -2.71 -2.40  
8 0.001 1.103 0.021 -0.012 -0.005 0.923 
 2.26 57.54 1.56 -4.10 -1.64  
9 0.002 1.029 -0.001 -0.008 -0.002 0.934 
 2.94 69.19 -0.09 -3.05 -0.98  
Big 10 -0.001 0.99 -0.02 0.001 0.004 0.947 
 -1.90 59.03 -2.01 0.51 2.22  
 
Table 3 reports ,i kb  estimates and associated Newey-West t-statistics for 10 industry 
portfolios. The results are reported in the same fashion as in Table 2. If the behavioral models are 
true, we expect that industries with more uncertainty would have a stronger mis-valuation pattern. 
                                                 
11 The only exception is Decile 10 portfolio. 
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Our empirical results are largely consistent with this prediction. Again, 1,ib  is generally positive, 
while 2,ib  and 3,ib  are generally negative. Furthermore, the only industry that does not exhibit 
this pattern is the Utilities industry, which has the least uncertainty due to regulatory oversight 
and control.   
That stocks under-react to common information at short horizons and over-react at longer 
horizons is one of the central findings of this paper. This finding complements the findings that 
stocks under-react to firm-specific information at short horizons and over-react at longer 
horizons, and should benefit researchers attempting to understand investor behavior. 
 
Table 3 Industry Portfolios 1941:01-2007:08 
We estimate the following model for each industry portfolio.  
12 24
, ,0 ,1 1 ,2 ,3 ,
2 13
i t i i t i t i t k i t k i t
k k
r b f b f b f b f eμ − − −
=
= + + + + +∑ ∑         
where tir ,  is the return of asset i at time t, ktf −  is the market-wide information at time t – k measured by 
the value-weighted market return,  and kib ,  is the sensitivity of stock i to the common information. 
,i kb estimates are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test t-statistics immediately below each 
main row. 
Industry 
iμ  0,ib  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  2R  
NoDur 0.005 0.935 0.194 -0.018 -0.026 0.701 
 2.49 24.08 7.42 -2.09 -3.69  
Durbl 0.001 1.182 0.233 -0.013 -0.023 0.683 
 0.3 25.43 6.38 -1.31 -2.34  
Manuf 0.002 1.102 0.176 -0.013 -0.014 0.771 
 1.37 31.57 6.38 -1.67 -2.17  
Energy 0.005 1.040 0.022 -0.001 -0.009 0.451 
 1.69 16.91 0.47 -0.07 -0.74  
HiTec 0.001 1.458 0.221 -0.024 -0.022 0.667 
 0.27 23.06 5.41 -2.01 -2.11  
Telcm 0.003 1.228 0.198 -0.024 -0.016 0.63 
 0.97 19.75 5.20 -2.15 -1.58  
Shops 0.003 1.044 0.260 -0.016 -0.024 0.693 
 1.29 27.15 8.53 -1.32 -2.88  
Hlth 0.005 1.188 0.176 -0.025 -0.022 0.636 
 2.18 35.11 4.91 -2.07 -2.11  
Utils 0.004 0.633 0.017 0.004 0.005 0.41 
 1.93 10.88 0.52 0.53 0.63  
Other 0.005 1.036 0.207 -0.018 -0.023 0.677 
 2.39 22.3 6.47 -2.05 -3.00  
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3.3 Predictive Power of Past Common Information 
The results in Tables 2 and 3 are informative. They show that stocks with more 
uncertainty or slower information diffusion statistically significantly under-react in the short run 
and over-react in the long run. The implication is that past common information should have the 
power to predict stock returns. We test this implication in this section. Examining the predictive 
power of past common information also provides a measure of the economic significance of the 
mis-reaction.  
Our idea is to use the past common information to predict the stock returns, then long the 
stocks with the highest predicted returns and short the stocks with the lowest predicted returns. If 
the delayed reaction is economically significant, the momentum portfolio should generate 
significant profits. More specifically, at the beginning of each month t, we first use the past 
common information to predict the month-t returns. The predicted return, tir ,ˆ , is the one-period 
ahead forecast from the following forecasting model:  
ti
k
kti
k
ktitiiti fcfcfcr ,
24
13
3,
12
2
2,11,, εμ ++++= ∑∑
=
−
=
−−                                                    (5)  
That is ∑∑
=
−
=
−− ++=
24
13
3,
12
2
2,11,, ˆˆˆˆ
k
kti
k
ktititi fcfcfcr . To obtain meaningful estimates, the coefficients 
of the model, ci,k, are estimated using the previous 24 years of returns. Consequently our test 
starts in 1965. We choose 1965 as our start date also because the momentum literature usually 
focuses on this sample period [see for instance Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)]. The coefficients 
are then used to compute the one-month-ahead predicted return for each asset. We update our 
estimates of ci,k every month by dropping the earliest observation and adding the latest 
observation every month in the regression. Based on the predicted returns, size/industry portfolios 
are then ranked in ascending order. Based on these rankings, we long the top three portfolios 
(winners) and short the bottom three (losers) in an equally-weighted fashion. These positions are 
held for one month.  
Table 4 presents the results. The momentum (Winner-Loser) profits for the size portfolios 
are reported in Panel A, and those for the industry portfolios are reported in Panel B. Table 4 also 
distinguishes between January and other calendar months. Overall, momentum strategies are 
significantly profitable in both sets of portfolios based on our forecasting model. Excluding 
January, the average profits for the size and industry portfolio are 0.95% per month (t-statistic of 
7.65), and 0.73% per month (t-statistic of 3.92), respectively.  
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Table 4 Momentum Profits Based on Predicted Returns 1965:01-2007:08 
We use the past common information to predict the stock returns, then long the stocks with the highest 
predicted returns and short the stocks with the lowest predicted returns. Table 3 presents the results. The 
momentum (Winner-Loser) profits for the size portfolios are reported in Panel A, and those for the industry 
portfolios are reported in Panels B. Table 4 also distinguishes between January and other calendar months. 
 Overall Jan Non-Jan 
 Panel A: Size Portfolios 
 Overall Jan Non-Jan 
Winner- loser 0.0103 0.0185 0.0095 
 7.94 2.56 7.65 
Winner 0.0148 0.0500 0.0115 
 6.20 5.16 4.82 
Loser 0.0045 0.0315 0.002 
 1.80 3.01 0.79 
    
 Panel B: Industry Portfolios 
Winner- loser 0.0074 0.0086 0.0073 
 4.06 1.09 3.92 
Winner 0.0147 0.06 0.0106 
 6.01 5.86 4.37 
Loser 0.0073 0.0514 0.0032 
 2.55 4.74 1.13 
 
We also further examine the economic significance of the long-run over-reaction since it 
could be true that the economic significance we document in Table 4 is mainly due to strong 
short-run under-reaction or 1,ib . Essentially, we repeat the above exercise except that the 
predicted return is now only based on the long-run over-reaction from the forecasting model 
Equation (5). That is ∑∑
=
−
=
− +=
24
13
3,
12
2
2,, ˆˆˆ
k
kti
k
ktiti fcfcr . Table 5 presents the results. The 
momentum profits for the size portfolios are reported in Panel A, and those for the industry 
portfolios are reported in Panel B. Table 5 also distinguishes between January and other calendar 
months. Overall, momentum strategies are still significantly profitable in the two sets of 
portfolios. Excluding January, the average profits for the size and industry portfolio are 0.35% 
per month (t-statistic = 3.06), and 0.50% per month (t-statistic = 2.71), respectively. Therefore, 
the long-run over-reaction is also economically significant. 
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Table 5 Momentum Profits Based on Long-Run Overreaction 1965:01-2007:08 
This table presents the momentum profits based on the long-horizon overreaction. The momentum 
(Winner-Loser) profits for the size portfolios are reported in Panel A, and those for the industry portfolios 
are reported in Panels B. Table 5 also distinguishes between January and other calendar months. 
 Overall Jan Non-Jan 
 Panel A: Size Portfolios 
 Overall Jan Non-Jan 
Winner- loser 0.0019 -0.0155 0.0035 
 1.56 -2.13 3.06 
Winner 0.0105 0.0298 0.0087 
 4.59 3.17 3.75 
Loser 0.0085 0.0453 0.0052 
 3.36 4.28 2.03 
    
 Panel B: Industry Portfolios 
Winner- loser 0.0038 -0.0098 0.0050 
 2.10 -1.41 2.71 
Winner 0.0128 0.0496 0.0094 
 5.52 5.33 4.05 
Loser 0.009 0.0594 0.0044 
 3.09 5.36 1.50 
 
Figure 1 depicts the profits accumulated through August 2007 starting with different 
investment months (excluding January). The solid line represents the profits based on both short-
run under-reaction and long-run over-reaction, while the dashed line represents the profits based 
on only long-run over-reaction. If the strategies are always profitable, the lines should slope 
monotonically downward. Although there are periods during which the lines are flat or even 
upward sloping, in most periods, the lines are downward sloping. These results suggest that the 
mis-reaction we document in this paper is robust for most periods and economically significant. 
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Figure 1 Cumulative Profits Given Alternative Dates of First Investing in the Strategy: 
1965:01-2007:08 
At the beginning of each month t, size/industry portfolios are ranked in ascending order on the basis of their 
predicted returns. Based on their rankings, we long in the top three portfolios (winners) and short the 
bottom three portfolios (losers) in an equal-weighted fashion. These positions are held for 1 month. The 
reported cumulative profit to entering in month t is ∑
=
08:2007
t
tWML
τ
, where tWML is the momentum profit in 
month t. 
Panel A: Size Portfolios 
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3.4 Market States and Delayed Reaction to Common Information 
Recently, Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed (2004) (CGH) suggest that the behavioral 
models of DHS and HS imply that mis-reaction depends on the market state: mis-reaction should 
be stronger following UP states and weaker following DOWN states. Following an UP market, 
aggregate overconfidence should be stronger since investors in the aggregate hold long positions 
in the stock market, which should cause stronger over-reaction as DHS suggest. Alternatively, 
risk aversion should be weaker following an UP market due to increases in wealth, which should 
lead to a greater delay in over-reaction according to HS. We test this implication in this section.  
Following CGH, we use the prior cumulative market returns to identify the market state. 
If it is non-negative (negative), we define the state of the market as “UP” (“DOWN”).  We use 
the measurement interval of the preceding two years to match our forecasting interval. To test 
whether delayed reaction depends on the UP and DOWN state, we follow CGH and regress the 
raw momentum profits we obtained from the last section on an UP dummy and an intercept. The 
estimated coefficients of the UP dummy and associated Newey-West t-statistics are reported in 
Table 6. Interestingly, momentum strategies are not significantly more profitable following UP 
market states, indicative that the delayed reaction to common information is not state dependent. 
The cause should be interesting for a future research.  
 
Table 6 Momentum Profits Based on Predicted Returns and Market States 1965:01-2007:08 
Following CGH, we use the prior cumulative market return to identify the market state. If it is non-negative 
(negative), we define the state of the market as “UP” (“DOWN”). ”). We use the measurement interval of 
prior two years to match our forecasting interval. To test whether delayed reaction depends on UP and 
DOWN, we follow CGH and regress raw momentum profits we obtained from the last section on an UP 
dummy and an intercept. The estimated coefficients of the UP dummy and associated Newey-West t-
statistics are reported in this table. 
 Size Portfolios Industry Portfolios 
Winner- loser -0.0045 -0.0011 
 -0.97 -0.23 
Winner -0.0068 -0.0076 
 -0.66 -0.67 
Loser -0.0023 -0.0065 
 -0.29 -0.72 
 
3.5 Tangible and Intangible Information 
Daniel and Titman (2006) show that stocks react to tangible news (past performance 
news) and intangible news (news not related to past performance or news related to growth 
potential) differently: stocks react to tangible news properly, but mis-react to intangible news. In 
the same spirit, we decompose common information into tangible and intangible components. 
Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) show that aggregate earnings are most closely related to 
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industrial production. We therefore use industrial production as a measure of the aggregate 
performance. We decompose the market return (the common information proxy) by using the 
following regression model. 
ttt ebIPaf ++= −2                                                                                                 (6) 
where tf  is the market-wide information at time t measured by the value-weighted market return, 
and 2−tIP  is the growth rate of industrial production at t – 2. We use 2−tIP  because the final 
industrial production data are usually announced with a two month delay. Unreported results 
show that there is a strong correlation between the market return and the 2-month lagged 
industrial production growth, the correlation coefficient is -0.22 with a t-statistics of -2.07. This is 
consistent with Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006).  
Following Daniel and Titman (2006), we use the fitted component of the regression as 
the measure of tangible news at time t, or the common information related to past performance of 
firms; we use the regression residual as the measure for intangible news, or the common 
information related to growth potential. We report the results for the size and industry portfolios 
in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 Panel A shows how the size portfolios react to tangible common 
information, while Panel B presents the results for intangible common information. None of the 
lagged tangible common information coefficients are significant, where 19 out of 30 lagged 
intangible common information coefficients are significant. The results for the industry portfolios 
are similar. Therefore, consistent with Daniel and Titman (2006), even for common information, 
stocks react to tangible news properly, but mis-react to intangible news. This suggests that the 
delayed reaction to common information we documented in Section 3.2 is mainly due to mis-
reaction to intangible common information. Not surprisingly, the 1,ib , 2,ib  and 3,ib  estimates in 
Tables 7 and 8, the sensitivities to intangible common information, are quite close to those 
reported in Tables 2 and 3 for overall common information. 
Industrial production growth may not capture all tangible common information. Flannery 
and Protopapadakis (2002) find six macro factors that influence stock returns: three nominal 
(CPI, PPI, and a Monetary Aggregate) and three real (Balance of Trade, Employment Report, and 
Housing Starts). We use these six variables to construct the tangible and intangible common 
information components. The results are similar as those reported in Tables 7 and 8.12 Thus, stock 
mis-reaction to common information is mainly due to mis-reaction to intangible common 
information, not tangible common information. 
                                                 
12 The results are available upon request. 
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Table 7 Stock Reaction to Tangible and Intangible Common Information: Size Portfolios 
We estimate the following model for each portfolio.  
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where tir ,  is the return of asset i at time t, ktf −  is tangible or intangible common information at time t – k, 
and kib ,  is the sensitivity of stock i. ,i kb estimates are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test 
t-statistics immediately below each main row. 
Industry 
iμ  0,ib  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  2R  
 Panel A Tangible Common Information 
Small 1 0.013 0.721 1.651 0.132 -0.301 0.012 
 0.29 0.89 1.41 0.58 -1.32  
2 0.006 1.039 1.500 0.064 -0.218 0.010 
 0.17 1.49 1.51 0.33 -1.29  
3 0.003 0.902 1.540 0.055 -0.179 0.009 
 0.12 1.36 1.55 0.29 -1.30  
4 0.002 0.947 1.281 0.057 -0.157 0.008 
 0.08 1.54 1.45 0.32 -1.17  
5 0.001 0.930 1.150 0.086 -0.160 0.008 
 0.06 1.53 1.47 0.51 -1.34  
6 -0.003 0.837 1.298 0.064 -0.113 0.008 
 -0.12 1.45 1.56 0.38 -1.00  
7 -0.001 0.923 1.295 0.071 -0.141 0.011 
 -0.03 1.59 1.64 0.42 -1.30  
8 -0.002 0.924 1.211 0.071 -0.131 0.010 
 -0.09 1.70 1.60 0.45 -1.37  
9 0.009 0.793 0.757 0.044 -0.152 0.006 
 0.46 1.52 1.10 0.31 -1.65  
Big 10 0.005 0.604 0.550 0.044 -0.101 0.002 
 0.35 1.27 0.94 0.35 -1.31  
 Panel B Intangible Common Information 
Small 1 0.014 1.113 0.354 -0.020 -0.028 0.576 
 7.28 20.93 7.43 -1.63 -2.38  
2 0.011 1.216 0.207 -0.019 -0.016 0.733 
 7.75 31.82 5.61 -1.94 -2.02  
3 0.011 1.210 0.155 -0.022 -0.012 0.791 
 9.84 37.84 5.09 -2.85 -2.04  
4 0.011 1.186 0.133 -0.016 -0.014 0.812 
 10.31 38.6 4.75 -2.35 -2.64  
5 0.011 1.173 0.098 -0.018 -0.009 0.84 
 12.31 41.45 4.20 -3.13 -1.86  
6 0.010 1.137 0.071 -0.016 -0.009 0.866 
 12.97 44.94 3.24 -2.94 -1.89  
7 0.011 1.125 0.060 -0.017 -0.007 0.903 
 15.13 59.01 3.39 -3.43 -1.85  
8 0.010 1.103 0.021 -0.017 -0.004 0.916 
 17.56 55.22 1.42 -4.83 -1.18  
9 0.01 1.028 0.000 -0.012 -0.001 0.929 
 22.06 65.19 -0.04 -3.47 -0.60  
Big 10 0.009 0.990 -0.018 -0.002 0.004 0.942 
 24.75 56.57 -1.74 -0.79 1.85  
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Table 8 Stock Reaction to Tangible and Intangible Common Information: Industry Portfolios 
We estimate the following model for each portfolio.  
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where tir ,  is the return of asset i at time t, ktf −  is tangible or intangible common information at time t – k, 
and kib ,  is the sensitivity of stock i. ,i kb estimates are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test 
t-statistics immediately below each main row. 
Industry 
iμ  0,ib  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  2R  
 Panel A Tangible Common Information 
NoDur -0.021 1.277 1.206 0.207 -0.095 0.018 
 -0.76 2.18 1.60 1.12 -0.74  
Durbl -0.004 0.536 1.665 0.082 -0.127 0.005 
 -0.11 0.67 1.55 0.32 -0.78  
Manuf -0.005 0.675 1.346 0.092 -0.100 0.006 
 -0.19 1.09 1.65 0.51 -0.82  
Energy 0.014 0.602 1.084 -0.04 -0.114 0.000 
 0.57 0.75 1.46 -0.27 -0.83  
HiTec 0.001 0.212 2.147 0.066 -0.159 0.004 
 0.04 0.26 2.71 0.29 -1.10  
Telcm 0.019 1.143 0.847 -0.019 -0.216 0.003 
 0.63 1.50 1.04 -0.08 -1.59  
Shops -0.025 1.521 1.790 0.242 -0.152 0.026 
 -0.79 2.36 2.06 1.23 -1.03  
Hlth -0.025 1.452 1.715 0.247 -0.131 0.016 
 -0.93 2.05 2.20 1.45 -0.91  
Utils 0.021 1.018 0.266 0.036 -0.221 0.014 
 0.66 1.72 0.30 0.29 -1.49  
Other 0.014 0.918 1.083 0.093 -0.263 0.013 
 0.44 1.44 1.14 0.43 -1.67  
 Panel B Intangible Common Information 
NoDur 0.010 0.929 0.195 -0.022 -0.025 0.692 
 7.69 22.99 7.36 -2.51 -3.43  
Durbl 0.010 1.185 0.241 -0.018 -0.02 0.685 
 6.23 24.49 6.47 -1.68 -1.98  
Manuf 0.012 1.103 0.180 -0.019 -0.014 0.767 
 9.90 30.59 6.42 -2.33 -1.98  
Energy 0.013 1.038 0.022 -0.001 -0.008 0.446 
 5.18 16.34 0.47 -0.07 -0.62  
HiTec 0.011 1.475 0.233 -0.027 -0.019 0.668 
 6.03 22.93 5.69 -2.26 -1.81  
Telcm 0.012 1.231 0.201 -0.027 -0.014 0.626 
 6.40 19.15 5.07 -2.24 -1.35  
Shops 0.011 1.038 0.256 -0.022 -0.024 0.680 
 6.46 26.05 8.23 -1.79 -2.70  
Hlth 0.013 1.195 0.180 -0.032 -0.019 0.630 
 6.68 34.88 4.92 -2.56 -1.84  
Utils 0.012 0.594 0.009 -0.001 0.004 0.415 
 9.03 11.49 0.26 -0.19 0.55  
Other 0.012 1.032 0.218 -0.019 -0.019 0.703 
 8.16 21.53 6.69 -2.04 -2.52  
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3.6 Fama-French Size and BM factors and Delayed Reaction to Common Information  
Vassalou (2003) finds that the Fama-French size and BM factors contain information 
about future economic growth.13 We find that stocks mis-react to such intangible common 
information. This observation thus motivates us to investigate whether the Fama-French size and 
BM factors also proxy the delayed reaction to such intangible common information. If so, we 
provide a complementary explanation for these two factors. Toward this end, we consider the 
following regression model:  
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where FF is either the size factor (SMB) or the BM factor (HML). If they do proxy delayed 
reaction, the lagged common information will lose their explanatory power.  
The results for two sets of US portfolios are reported in Tables 9 and 10. Panel As present 
the results for the size factor, while Panel Bs present the results for the BM factor. ,i kb estimates 
and associated Newey-West t-statistics are reported. The values reported in the main rows are the 
actual values of ,i kb estimates, and the entries below are the Newey-West test statistics. When the 
size factor is added, the lagged market returns generally become either insignificant or less 
significant. Compare Panel A of Table 9 to Table 2, the number of the significant lagged 
common-factor coefficients (i.e. ,i kb  for k = 1, 2 and 3) for the size-sorted portfolios decrease 
from 22 out of 30 to 5 out of 30. Even the remaining five significant coefficients become less 
significant. For instance, for the smallest decile portfolio, b1,1 decreases from 0.342 with a t-
statistic of 7.39 to 0.168 with a t-statistic of 3.61. Similar patterns are also found in Panel A of 
Table 10 for the industry portfolios. The number of significant lagged common-factor coefficients 
for the industry portfolios decreases from 20 out of 30 to 9 out of 30. Similarly, the remaining 
significant coefficients also become less significant. Therefore, the evidence seems to suggest that 
the Fama-French size factor to some extent also proxies the delayed reaction to intangible 
common information.  
However, adding the BM factor seems to have little impact. For instance, compare Panel 
B of Table 9 to Table 2, the results for the size portfolios are almost identical with or without the 
BM factor. There are still 24 coefficients of the lagged common information variables that are 
significant. Furthermore, their significance is almost identical to that without the BM factor. 
Similar patterns are also found for the industry portfolios. Therefore, the Fama-French BM factor 
seems to be unrelated to the stock delayed reaction to intangible common information. 
                                                 
13 See also Li, Vassalou, and Xing (2006) among others. 
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Table 9 Delayed Reaction and Fama-French Size and BM Factors: Size-Sorted Portfolios  
We estimate the following model for each portfolio.  
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where tir ,  is the return of asset i at time t, ktf −  is the market-wide information at time t – k measured by 
the value-weighted market return, FF is either the size factor or the book-to-market factor, and kib ,  is the 
sensitivity of stock i. ,i kb estimates are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test t-statistics 
immediately below each main row. 
Size 
iμ  0,ib  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  4,ib  2R  
Panel A: FF = the size factor 
Small 1 0.006 0.889 0.168 -0.006 -0.018 1.235 0.763 
 2.93 25.44 3.61 -0.72 -2.48 8.57  
2 0.000 1.034 0.059 -0.002 -0.006 1.017 0.918 
 0.21 49.27 1.82 -0.35 -1.41 9.87  
3 0.001 1.047 0.028 -0.006 -0.004 0.859 0.946 
 1.29 60.95 1.07 -1.62 -1.23 8.46  
4 0.000 1.042 0.016 -0.001 -0.005 0.779 0.947 
 0.51 53.16 0.68 -0.31 -1.88 8.05  
5 0.001 1.051 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 0.647 0.943 
 1.42 52.55 0.10 -1.74 -0.83 7.09  
6 0.001 1.050 0.003 -0.005 -0.003 0.466 0.929 
 1.37 55.19 0.12 -1.40 -1.06 4.63  
7 0.001 1.066 0.013 -0.008 -0.004 0.320 0.937 
 2.21 61.18 0.62 -2.39 -1.41 3.69  
8 0.001 1.066 -0.008 -0.010 -0.002 0.202 0.935 
 1.98 54.72 -0.46 -3.80 -0.83 2.92  
9 0.001 1.023 -0.005 -0.008 -0.002 0.033 0.935 
 2.82 74.2 -0.37 -2.73 -0.76 0.53  
Big 10 -0.001 1.031 0.011 -0.002 0.001 -0.222 0.966 
 -1.61 72.19 1.04 -0.90 0.53 -5.77  
Panel B: FF = the BM factor 
Small 1 0.004 1.190 0.332 -0.023 -0.032 0.464 0.570 
 1.56 20.67 7.51 -1.96 -2.83 2.33  
2 0.000 1.259 0.198 -0.016 -0.018 0.237 0.738 
 0.00 31.20 5.78 -1.76 -2.38 1.89  
3 0.001 1.230 0.146 -0.018 -0.014 0.154 0.797 
 0.73 40.10 5.14 -2.60 -2.47 1.97  
4 0.001 1.203 0.124 -0.012 -0.015 0.107 0.814 
 0.46 40.96 4.70 -1.85 -2.93 1.40  
5 0.001 1.183 0.092 -0.014 -0.011 0.079 0.844 
 0.91 46.13 4.13 -2.62 -2.22 1.16  
6 0.001 1.154 0.066 -0.011 -0.009 0.114 0.875 
 0.61 52.25 3.22 -2.34 -2.11 2.38  
7 0.001 1.143 0.055 -0.013 -0.007 0.118 0.912 
 1.16 63.85 3.44 -2.77 -2.27 3.50  
8 0.001 1.120 0.018 -0.013 -0.004 0.110 0.926 
 1.16 60.70 1.46 -4.17 -1.45 3.67  
9 0.001 1.047 -0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.117 0.939 
 1.46 75.26 -0.47 -3.08 -0.71 3.31  
Big 10 -0.001 0.995 -0.021 0.001 0.004 0.029 0.947 
 -1.83 67.28 -2.23 0.47 2.20 0.51  
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Table 10 Delayed Reaction and Fama-French Size and BM Factors: Industry Portfolios 
We estimate the following model for each portfolio.  
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where tir ,  is the return of asset i at time t, ktf −  is the market-wide information at time t – k measured by 
the value-weighted market return, FF is either the size factor or the book-to-market factor, and kib ,  is the 
sensitivity of stock i. ,i kb estimates are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test t-statistics 
immediately below each main row. 
Industry 
iμ  0,ib  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  4,ib  2R  
Panel A: FF = the size factor 
NoDur 0.004 0.808 0.098 -0.008 -0.017 0.683 0.838 
 2.99 29.37 2.90 -1.33 -3.10 4.95  
Durbl 0.000 1.015 0.105 -0.001 -0.010 0.901 0.830 
 -0.26 29.47 2.37 -0.14 -1.40 5.52  
Manuf 0.001 0.971 0.076 -0.003 -0.005 0.704 0.890 
 1.29 37.68 2.31 -0.55 -1.04 5.69  
Energy 0.004 0.959 -0.040 0.005 -0.003 0.437 0.482 
 1.50 16.47 -0.81 0.38 -0.30 3.06  
HiTec -0.001 1.226 0.044 -0.007 -0.005 1.254 0.855 
 -0.42 22.22 1.33 -0.84 -0.65 20.77  
Telcm 0.002 1.088 0.092 -0.014 -0.006 0.753 0.719 
 0.58 18.77 2.95 -1.16 -0.59 12.92  
Shops 0.002 0.894 0.145 -0.005 -0.014 0.810 0.842 
 1.32 31.75 3.67 -0.55 -2.13 5.44  
Hlth 0.004 1.018 0.046 -0.013 -0.009 0.921 0.781 
 2.1 29.85 1.91 -1.33 -1.11 10.3  
Utils 0.004 0.622 0.008 0.005 0.006 0.059 0.410 
 1.88 13.06 0.24 0.61 0.75 0.57  
Other 0.004 0.900 0.104 -0.008 -0.014 0.730 0.800 
 2.87 26.7 2.87 -1.18 -2.45 4.79  
Panel B: FF = the BM factor 
NoDur 0.003 0.980 0.188 -0.018 -0.024 0.287 0.726 
 1.60 28.16 7.31 -2.28 -3.70 5.38  
Durbl -0.001 1.235 0.225 -0.014 -0.021 0.343 0.704 
 -0.64 29.58 6.37 -1.47 -2.24 4.30  
Manuf 0.001 1.145 0.169 -0.013 -0.013 0.283 0.791 
 0.37 39.66 6.43 -1.84 -2.04 5.67  
Energy 0.002 1.106 0.012 -0.002 -0.007 0.428 0.482 
 0.77 20.4 0.26 -0.13 -0.55 4.71  
HiTec 0.003 1.392 0.230 -0.023 -0.024 -0.427 0.689 
 1.20 27.61 5.41 -1.98 -2.32 -2.33  
Telcm 0.004 1.19 0.204 -0.023 -0.017 -0.245 0.639 
 1.65 26.32 5.01 -2.17 -1.72 -1.48  
Shops 0.002 1.066 0.256 -0.016 -0.024 0.140 0.697 
 0.93 27.99 8.60 -1.37 -2.84 2.14  
Hlth 0.008 1.128 0.185 -0.024 -0.024 -0.394 0.663 
 3.00 26.56 4.98 -2.06 -2.37 -3.24  
Utils 0.001 0.719 0.004 0.003 0.008 0.559 0.541 
 0.33 14.12 0.15 0.35 1.15 5.65  
Other 0.002 1.117 0.195 -0.019 -0.02 0.527 0.742 
 1.02 28.84 6.46 -2.30 -2.83 6.07  
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To confirm our findings, we directly test the relationship between the delayed reaction 
and the Fama-French size and BM factors with the following regression model. 
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where tFF  is either the size factor or the book-to-market factor at time t, and ktf −  is the market-
wide information at time t – k measured by the value-weighted market return. The results are 
reported in Table 11. ,i kb estimates are reported in the main rows, with the Newey-West test t-
statistics immediately below each main row. As we expected, only the size factor proxies the 
delayed reaction to common information in the sense that the coefficients of the lagged common 
information variable are significant. The BM factor is not related to the delayed reaction. Thus, 
our results suggest that the size factor may not only proxy future economic growth as Vassalou 
(2003) argues, but also the delayed reaction to such news related to future economic growth.  
 
Table 11 Delayed Reaction and Fama-French Size and BM Factors 
We estimate the following model for the Fama-French size and BM factors.  
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where tir ,  is either the size factor or the book-to-market factor at time t, and ktf −  is the market-wide 
information at time t – k measured by the value-weighted market return. ,i kb estimates are reported in the 
main rows, with the Newey-West test t-statistics immediately below each main row. 
 
iμ  1,ib  2,ib  3,ib  2R  
Size Factor 0.003 0.154 -0.014 -0.016 0.061 
 2.25 5.59 -2.12 -2.76  
BM Factor 0.004 0.012 0.002 -0.004 -0.003 
 3.18 0.51 0.35 -0.60  
 
4. Conclusion 
An anomaly within the behavioral literature is that, to date, there is as yet no evidence 
suggesting that stocks also mis-react to common information as they do to firm-specific 
information. For instance, Kothari, Lewellen, and Warner (2006) recently find that market level 
returns neither under- nor over-react to common information. We ague in this paper that even if 
stocks under- and/or over-react to common information at the security level, the reaction pattern 
may not be evident at the market level if only some stocks have such a pattern and their 
capitalization is small. We thus examine stock reaction to common information at the stock level 
in this paper. We find a statistically and economically significant reaction pattern to common 
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information as the behavioral models suggest. This finding complements the findings of stock 
mis-reaction to firm-specific information, and thus should benefit researchers attempting to 
understand investor behavior. Furthermore, we find that the Fama-French size factor seems to 
proxy this delayed reaction to common information, and that the delayed reaction to common 
information is mainly due to mis-reaction to intangible common information. Considered 
together, our results supplement Vassalou (2003) and suggest that the size factor may not only 
proxy future economic growth, but also the delayed reaction to the news related to future 
economic growth. This paper therefore also contributes the literature by advancing an 
understanding of the size factor. 
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Appendix 
Based on the return-generating model in Equation (1a), we can easily see the implication 
of Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), and Lewellen (2002). The cross-
serial covariance between the return of i and j is 
 ∑
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−− =
K
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,,,, ),cov( σ                                                                               (9) 
where 22 )( ftfE σ= . Consequently, using this model, the stock price reaction to the common 
factor entirely determines the cross-serial correlation between stocks.14 As the behavioral models 
suggest, some stock returns, i, under- and over-react to information ( 00, ≠≠ kallforb ki ), 
while some other stocks, j, do not ( 00, ≠= kallforb kj ). So 
2
0,,
2
,,,, ),cov( fjni
K
nk
fnkjkintjti bbbbrr σσ ==∑
=
−−  and 0),cov(
2
,,,, ==∑
=
−−
K
nk
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…, K.  Since 020, >fjb σ , )()],[cov( ,,, nintjti bsignrrsign =− . One thus may infer stock under- or 
over-reaction to the common factor from cross-serial correlations between stock returns. For 
example, if 0),cov( 1,, >−tjti rr  but 0),cov( 1,, =−titj rr , (j leads i since j’s return predicts i’s return 
but the reverse is not true), this implies that 01, >ib  and 01, =jb (stock i under-reacts to the 
common factor in the short run but stock j does not).  Thus, the short-run lead-lag evidence in Lo 
and MacKinlay (1990) is consistent with the short-run under-reaction of some stocks to the 
common information.15 On the other hand, if 0),cov( ,, <−ntjti rr  but 0),cov( ,, =−ntitj rr for n = 1, 
…, K (j again leads i), then it implies that 00, ≠< kallforb ki and 00, ≠= kallforb kj (stock 
i over-reacts to the common factor but stock j does not). Hence, the negative average of cross-serial 
correlations across lags from 1 to 30 in Lewellen (2002) may suggest over-reaction at all horizons. 
However, it is important to note that if stocks under-react in the short run, 0, >kib  for 
some small k, and over-react in the long run 0, <kib  for some large k as suggested by the 
behavioral models, calculating the average of cross-serial correlations for lags from 1 to 30 as in 
Lewellen (2002), is not appropriate. First, an average of cross-serial correlations may mask 
different cross-serial correlations at different horizons. Thus, the evidence in Lewellen (2002) 
                                                 
14 It is easy to see that it also determines in part the serial autocorrelation of stock returns. 
15 This is consistent with the results of Jegadeesh and Titman (1995). 
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may not necessarily imply a rejection of the recent behavioral models. Secondly, the test may 
have little power because positive cross-serial covariances at short horizons will offset negative 
cross-serial covariances at longer horizons.  
 25
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